• Excessive Testimony: When Less Is More 

      Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2022)
      This paper identifies two distinct dimensions of what might be called testimonial strength: first, in the case of testimony from more than one speaker, testimony can be said to be stronger to the extent that a greater ...
    • Scientific Progress: By-Whom or For-Whom? 

      Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2023)
      When science makes cognitive progress, who or what is it that improves in the requisite way? According to a widespread and unchallenged assumption, it is the cognitive attitudes of scientists themselves, i.e. the agents ...
    • Scientific Realism in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Seven Sciences and History and Philosophy of Science 

      Beebe, James; Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2020)
      We report the results of a study that investigated the views of researchers working in seven scientific disciplines and in history and philosophy of science in regard to four hypothesized dimensions of scientific realism. ...
    • Thinking about Progress: From Science to Philosophy 

      Dellsén, Finnur Ulf; Lawler, Insa; Norton, James (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2021)
      Is there progress in philosophy? If so, how much? Philosophers have recently argued for a wide range of answers to these questions, from the view that there is no progress whatsoever to the view that philosophy has provided ...
    • Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account 

      Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2021)
      What is scientific progress? This paper advances an interpretation of this question, and an account that serves to answer it (thus interpreted). Roughly, the question is here understood to concern what type of cognitive ...
    • Would Disagreement Undermine Progress? 

      Dellsén, Finnur Ulf; Lawler, Insa; Norton, James (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2022)
      In recent years, several philosophers have argued that their discipline makes no progress (or not enough in comparison to the ‘hard sciences’). A key argument for this pessimistic position appeals to the purported fact ...