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dc.contributor.authorLundesgaard, Jon
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-31T08:28:26Z
dc.date.available2013-10-31T08:28:26Z
dc.date.issued2001
dc.identifier.citationLundesgaard, J. (2001). The Holmström-Milgrom Model: A Simplified and Illustrated Version. Scandinavian Journal of Management 17(3), 287-303no_NO
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/134588
dc.descriptionFagfellevurdert artikkel tidligere publisert i Scandinavian Journal of Management, 2001, 17(3). http://www.journals.elsevier.com/scandinavian-journal-of-management/no_NO
dc.description.abstractIn principal-agent theory, Holmström (1979, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74–91) offers the canonical model including a hidden one-shot action taken by an agent contracted to provide effort. Holmström's classical investigation led to an important body of applied literature. In investigating a specification in which effort is a sequence of actions, Holmström and Milgrom (1987, Econometrica, 55, 303–328) were able to provide a proof of the optimality of linear reward schemes (in the one-shot model, reward schemes are never linear). The sequence-of-actions model has a corresponding (static), very tractable companion. In this paper a simplified and illustrated version of this model is presented.no_NO
dc.language.isonobno_NO
dc.publisherElsevierno_NO
dc.subjectinformasjonsøkonomino_NO
dc.subjectmoralsk risikono_NO
dc.subjectPrincipal–agent teorino_NO
dc.subjectmikroøkonomino_NO
dc.titleThe Holmström-Milgrom Model: A Simplified and Illustrated Versionno_NO
dc.typeJournal articleno_NO
dc.typePeer reviewedno_NO
dc.source.pagenumber287-303no_NO
dc.source.volume17no_NO
dc.source.journalScandinavian Journal of Managementno_NO
dc.source.issue3no_NO


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