dc.contributor.author | Lundesgaard, Jon | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-31T08:28:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-10-31T08:28:26Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Lundesgaard, J. (2001). The Holmström-Milgrom Model: A Simplified and Illustrated Version. Scandinavian Journal of Management 17(3), 287-303 | no_NO |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/134588 | |
dc.description | Fagfellevurdert artikkel tidligere publisert i Scandinavian Journal of Management, 2001, 17(3). http://www.journals.elsevier.com/scandinavian-journal-of-management/ | no_NO |
dc.description.abstract | In principal-agent theory, Holmström (1979, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74–91) offers the canonical model including a hidden one-shot action taken by an agent contracted to provide effort. Holmström's classical investigation led to an important body of applied literature. In investigating a specification in which effort is a sequence of actions, Holmström and Milgrom (1987, Econometrica, 55, 303–328) were able to provide a proof of the optimality of linear reward schemes (in the one-shot model, reward schemes are never linear). The sequence-of-actions model has a corresponding (static), very tractable companion. In this paper a simplified and illustrated version of this model is presented. | no_NO |
dc.language.iso | nob | no_NO |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | no_NO |
dc.subject | informasjonsøkonomi | no_NO |
dc.subject | moralsk risiko | no_NO |
dc.subject | Principal–agent teori | no_NO |
dc.subject | mikroøkonomi | no_NO |
dc.title | The Holmström-Milgrom Model: A Simplified and Illustrated Version | no_NO |
dc.type | Journal article | no_NO |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | no_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 287-303 | no_NO |
dc.source.volume | 17 | no_NO |
dc.source.journal | Scandinavian Journal of Management | no_NO |
dc.source.issue | 3 | no_NO |