Beliefs as dispositions to make judgments

Abstract

Smithies’ conception of belief has two noteworthy components: first, the claim that beliefs are fully constituted by dispositions to cause (conscious) judgments (132).2 Second, the claim that judgments have phenomenology: there's something it's like’ to make a judgment (4). Indeed, Smithies holds that judgments have both attitude- and content-specific phenomenology—that's to say that the judgment that p has a certain phenomenal character in virtue of being a judgment that p (rather than, say, a desire that p) and another, interlocking, character in virtue of being a judgment that p (rather than, say, a judgment that q). Let's label each component for easy reference: "one–track disposition": Beliefs are fully constituted by dispositions to cause judgments. "j–phenomenology": Judgments have (attitude- and content-specific) phenomenal character/s. I'll discuss both components, as well as the arguments Smithies gives in their support. It'll emerge, as we go, why this conception of belief is important to his overall project in ERO. The arguments can be divided into those that support the full conception (one–track disposition & j–phenomenology), and those that specifically support j–phenomenology. Smithies argues, first, that the conception of beliefs as one-track dispositions to make conscious judgments (best) explains the distinction between beliefs and sub-doxastic states (124–38; §2–3 below). Second, he argues, it explains Accessibilism about justification (148–52, 165–75; §4), which he thinks can be independently motivated (223 ff.). Next he argues that j–phenomenology explains phenomenal contrast cases featuring judgments (140–4; §5) as well as the ‘introspective datum’ that “we can sometimes know by introspection alone which judgments we're currently making” (145–8; §6). The best explanation of this, Smithies argues, is that judgments have phenomenal content and force. (And the best explanation of our introspective knowledge of what we believe is that beliefs are one-track dispositions to make such judgments [148].)